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Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States: Seizing Attorney Fees-Frozen

Assets or Frozen Justice? The Sixth
Amendment Right To Counsel Of Choice
is Given the Cold Shoulder
"No, no!"
wards."

said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict afterLewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, Chapter 12'

If society merely wants automatic convictions then a hamstrung defense will facilitate achievement of that shabby aim,
but if society desires that courts engage in a search for truth,
before punishing, then I would avoid being stingy with defense
materials.
Circuit Judge Finnegan,2
dissenting in United States v. Brodson
I.

INTRODUCTION

Drugs and organized crime are problems facing the United States
and the world community. Judges in the South American country of
Columbia have experienced first hand the wrath of powerful drug
cartels.' The illicit wealth of drug dealers in our society is flaunted in
front of the American public in newspaper accounts, television shows,
and musical lyrics. The legislative and executive branches of our
government have made commitments in waging a war against drugs
and organized crime in our country. One of those commitments
of legislation aimed at removoccurred in 1970 with the introduction
4
criminals.
these
of
ing the wealth
1. Logical Nonsense: The Work of Lewis Carrol, 177 (P. C. Blackburn & L.
White ed. 1934).
2. 241 F.2d 107, 115 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911(1957).
3. See U.S. District Judge Mark Costantino, Quotes, 75 A.B.A. J. 35 (Dec.
1989). During sentencing of 4 Columbian drug traffickers, Judge Costantino remarked

that 32 chief judges have been killed in Columbia. Id.

4. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848,
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The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 and the Organized Crime Control Act of 19706 were enacted to
remove the financial power of organized crime and drug dealers by
permitting the forfeiture of assets derived from the proceeds of crime.
These criminal forfeiture provisions were codified under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise 7 (CCE) statute and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization' (RICO) statute. Under these statutes, a
defendant's assets, derived from the proceeds of crime, become the
government's property upon conviction. However, a major loophole
was present in these forfeiture statutes. The forfeiture statutes allowed
defendants to transfer forfeitable assets to a third party before
conviction and evade forfeiture. 9 The government could not prevent
these transfers nor subsequently regain the assets.10 Congress responded to this loophole by passing the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984." I The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 plugged the
2
loophole by freezing a defendant's assets before conviction.
The law firm of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered asserted that use
of the CCE forfeiture statute to restrain bona fide attorney fees
violated the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice in certain
situations. 3 Those situations occur when a defendant is unable to
retain counsel of choice due to fear of fee forfeiture or because his
nonforfeitable assets are insufficient to retain counsel.' 4 Chaplin &
Drysdale, Chartered limited its constitutional challenge to situations
wherein the government's forced indigency erected an obstacle to a
defendant's choice of counsel.
853 (1988)) (named the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE)). Another piece
of legislation passed in 1970 was the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91 452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)) (named the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act (RICO)).
5. Supra note 4.
6. Supra note 4.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
9. "Congress held hearings to investigate the use of criminal forfeitures under
RICO and CCE, and many shortcomings in the existing statutes were identified. The
most significant of these was the government's inability to prevent the concealment
or transfer of forfeitable assets to third parties ....

."

Winick, Forfeiture of Attor-

neys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The
Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAw L. REV. 765, 769 (1989).
10. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984).
12. Infra note 35 and accompanying text.
13. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652
(1989).
14. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States rejected this challenge. 5 The Court found that the government
had legitimate and substantial interests. 6 The Court applied a balancing test and concluded that the government's interest in restraining
forfeitable assets was stronger than the interest of the accused in using
the assets for counsel of choice.' 7 However, the result reached by the
Court is troublesome.
Should an individual's right to choose counsel depend on whether
his or her alleged crime is particularly distasteful to society? If this
question were answered in the abstract, then the answer should be
no. However, drugs and organized crime do not occur in a vacuum
and an abstract answer is not likely in the real world. These illicit
activities tend to elicit a practical response that strong measures are
needed to cripple drug dealers and organized crime. The antidrug
sentiment in our society is strong. The lucrative nature of drugs and
organized crime has enabled individuals engaged in these activities to
afford high priced legal talent. A prevalent view in our society is that
these wealthy criminals should be stripped of this advantage. Disabling
a defendant's ability to choose counsel while useful for the government
denigrates an individual's faith in an adversary system that seeks to
punish him before trial or conviction. The sixth amendment should
protect the integrity of the adversary system and the unsavory nature
of those protected should not enter into the equation. This note
concludes that the end does not justify the means. To reach this
conclusion, this note will examine the decision in Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered. Part II discusses the origin of criminal forfeiture statutes
and provides a brief overview of the sixth amendment as it relates to
counsel of choice. Part III will examine the facts, procedural history,
and Supreme Court's decision in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered.
Finally, Part IV will examine the arguments that the sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice should be accorded greater protection than
it received in this decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

CRIMINAL FORFEITURES AND THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE

ACT OF 1984

Criminal forfeitures are aimed at punishing the owner of property
incident to a conviction for a crime.' 8 Such forfeitures have tradition15. Id.

16. Id. at 2652-56.
17. Id. at 2654-55.

18. See United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1987). Criminal
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ally been disfavored by law.' 9 The prohibition against forfeiture of
estates as a consequence of a federal conviction dates back to 1790.20
In fact, Congress has authorized criminal forfeiture only once between
1790-1970: the Confiscation Act of 1862 which authorized the seizure
of estates of confederate sympathizers. 2 ' Criminal forfeiture provisions
reemerged in 1970 for use in the war against illegal drugs and
22
organized crime.
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 codified a criminal forfeiture provision in section 853, Title 21
of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statuteY In addition,

forfeiture, also called in personam forfeiture, is different from civil forfeiture, also
called in rem forfeiture. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained that in civil forfeiture the property becomes the defendant and the burden
of proof rests on the party alleging ownership. The innocence of the owner is
irrelevant. In contrast, in a criminal forfeiture, the principle objective is punishing a
guilty person, who owns the property. The burden of proof falls on the government.
The Third Circuit stated that insofar as the forfeiture is dependant upon the illegal
activity, the government must prove the elements of the underlying crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit implied that criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 is an in personam forfeiture. Id. But see, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-90 (1974) (fact that the owners of a forfeited yacht
were neither involved in nor had knowledge of their lesees' unlawful activity is
irrelevant under civil forfeiture).
19. "[Tlhe prohibition of forfeiture of an estate for conviction of treason [is]
contained in article III of the United States Constitution" and was extended to any
crime by the first federal criminal code enacted in 1790. "Although use of civil
forfeiture continued, Congress used criminal forfeiture only once during the entire
period from 1790 to 1970: the Confiscation Act of 1862." Winick, Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The
Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 768 (1989).
20. "Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563 (1982)) '[N]o conviction or judgment ...shall work corruption of blood, or
any forfeiture of estate') repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 66 212 (a) (2), 235 (a) (1), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2031-32." Winick, Forfeiture
of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The
Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765, 768 n.10
(1989).
21. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the
statute, not on any theory that criminal forfeitures were generally constitutional, but because the particular statute in issue was considered to be
constitutionally permitted by virtue of its origin in the War Powers.
Annotation, Criminal Forfeiture, 88 A.L.R. FED. 189, 197 (1988).
22. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (a) (1988). The statute states in relevant part:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of
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the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
enacted on October 15, 1970, contained a forfeiture provision codified
in section 1963, Title 18. 24 The goal of these forfeiture statutes was
25
to attack the economic bases of drug dealers and organized crime.
However, these statutes contained a major flaw. 26 The fatal flaw in

the CCE and RICO forfeiture provisions was the government's ina-

bility to prevent or recover assets transferred to third parties prior to
conviction. 27 Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, the government could seize assets only after the
defendant was found guilty. These statutes did not have a procedure

Id.

this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit
to the United States, irrespective of any provision of state law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit,
in addition to property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest
in, claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a source of
control over, the continuing criminal enterprise.
The court in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to
any other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or subchapter II of
this chapter, that the person forfeit to the United States all property
described in this subsection.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). The statute in relevant part states:
shall
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter .
forfeit to the United States irrespective, of any provision of State law(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962;

(2) any(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

interest in;
security of;
claim against; or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source or
influence over; any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct
of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
Id. For a comparison of the RICO statute as it existed before and after 1984, see
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1336-39 (D. Colo. 1985).
25. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 9.
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allowing for preindictment restraining orders or recovery of assets
transferred to third parties.
Congress responded to this flaw by passing the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984,28 which amended the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions. 29 Congress' stated purpose in amending these statutes
was to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal
forfeiture, and insure that transfers or concealment of property could
not be used to avoid forfeiture2 ° The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984 ( the "Act") made two important changes which molded the
forfeiture statutes into effective devices.
The first change was the Act's insertion of a legislative fiction
called the relation-back doctrine into the forfeiture statutes .3 The
relation-back doctrine gives the government a property interest in
forfeitable assets upon the commission of the act giving rise to the
forfeiture. 32 Under this doctrine, the government's property interest
comes into existence when the crime is alleged to have been committed,
not upon conviction.3 3 This preconviction interest is unlike that found
in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 which came into existence only upon conviction. However, the
relation-back property interest does not perfect until after the defen34
dant has been convicted of the crime.
The Act's second change permitted the issuance of a restraining
order before, during, or after indictment.3 The government using
28. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-23, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984).
29. The RICO and CCE statutes are almost identical. Compare 18 U.S.C. §

1963 (1988) with 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) to see the similarity between these statutes.
30. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEWS 3379.
31. The "relation-back" provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853 (c) (1988) states:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this
section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise
to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently
transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the

United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to
subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of
such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to

Id.

believe the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
32. Id.

33. Id.
34. See id.

35. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (e) (1) (1988) states:
(e) Protective orders
(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a
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these changes is able to restrain assets before conviction and recover
assets transferred to a third party.
While the Act solidified the government's control of forfeitable
assets, it also provided a mechanism for third parties to escape
forfeiture of assets in their possession.3 6 The mechanism for third

Id.

restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory
performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of
property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture under this
section(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a
violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter for
which criminal forfeiture may be ordered under this section and
alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought
would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under
this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if,
after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property
and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the
order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from
the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for
forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any
party against whom the order is to be entered:
[a section of the statute related to timing is omitted]
(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered
upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a
hearing when an information or indictment has not yet been filed with
respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates that there is
probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order
is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under
this section and that provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of
the property for forfeiture . ...
36. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (n) (1988). The pertinent parts state:
(n) Third party interests
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in

property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to
this section may, within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his
receipt of notice under paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court
for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property.
The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury.
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has
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parties to retain title to assets, transferred after the commission of
the crime, required a third party to prove two conditions: first, he
was a bona fide purchaser for value and second, he had no reason to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.37
However, the Act's mechanism that protects creditors of the
defendant from government confiscation of transferred assets does
not protect defense attorneys. Defense attorneys do not fall within
the mechanism's protection because of the statutory requirement that
a creditor must "at the time of the purchase [be] reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.''3 While
a car dealer or real estate salesperson can plead ignorance, a defense
attorney by nature of his vocation cannot keep himself ignorant of
his client's situation. A defense attorney with a client charged under
the RICO or CCE statutes is always on notice that assets may be
subject to forfeiture. In addition, the inherent nature of a criminal
defense attorney requires him to inquire into a client's illegal activities
to provide a competent defense. Therefore, a criminal defense attorney
cannot reasonably assert his ignorance of potential forfeiture. Hence,
private attorneys, subject to forfeiture of fees, are reluctant to accept
a defendant who is under a cloud of forfeiture.3 9 Congress foresaw

Id.

established by a preponderance of the evidence that(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property,
and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in
whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the
petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior any right, title, or
interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which
gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title,
or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under
this section; the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance
with its determination.
(7) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this
subsection, or if no such petitions are filed following the expiration of the
period provided in paragraph (2) for the filing of such petitions, the United
States shall have clear title to the property that is the subject of the order
of forfeiture and may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or
transferee.

37. Id.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (c) (1988).
39. "In September Miami lawyer Joel Hirschhorn announced he would no
longer defend drug traffickers because three of his fees have been seized. He told the
Wall Street Journal that six attorneys have contacted him contemplating similar
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the potential conflict wherein restraining attorney fees might violate
the sixth amendment. However, Congress deferred to the judgment
of the judiciary as to the constitutionality of the statute's application
against criminal defense attorneys .4
B.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE

The constitutionality of restraining attorney fees under the forfeiture statutes was contingent on the scope of an individual's right
to counsel of choice under the sixth amendment. The sixth amendment
guarantees that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
4
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.1 ,
The Supreme Court has described the right to counsel of choice as a
qualified right.42 Recently, the Court stated that "the district court
must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of
choice, but that presumption may be overcome ... by a showing of
' 43 The Court listed some of the
a serious potential for conflict.
limitations on choosing counsel: an attorney must be a member of
the bar; the defendant cannot insist on a chosen attorney that he
cannot afford; and the attorney must not have a -previous or ongoing
relationship with the opposing party." The Court reiterated its view
that counsel of choice is limited when it allowed a district court to
45
override a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel. The problem
presented in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States was
whether a defendant's right to counsel of choice could be obstructed
by withholding funds for counsel until completition of trial. In other
words, is it permissible under the sixth amendment for the government
to force indigency upon a person to disable his or her ability to
choose counsel?
The Supreme Court in Caplin & Drysdale, Charteredweighed the
government's interests, which included a discussion of the use of
forfeiture statutes to remove a defendant's ability to choose "high
career moves. Another Miami lawyer, tax specialist Robert Brier, is now declining
cases from those accused of narcotics charges." Fricker, Dirty Money, 75 A.B.A. J.
60, 64 (Nov. 1989). See also Berg, RICO Risks, 75 A.B.A. J. 28 (Oct. 1989).
40. Infra note 79.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (Supreme Court upheld

the district court's discretion in declining petitioner's waiver of his right to conflictfree counsel where his proposed counsel was already representing co-defendants).

43. Id. at 164.
44. Id. at 159.
45. Id. at 164.
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priced legal talent," against the defendant's constitutional right to
counsel of choice. 46 The question begging an answer was whether an
individual's right to counsel of choice was so insubstantial that it
could be effectively foreclosed by freezing assets needed to retain
counsel. The answer to this question turns on whether a defendant's
choice of counsel or the government's potential title to assets is more
important under the Constitution.
III.

A.

CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED V. UNITED
STATES

FACTS

In the summer of 1983, Christopher Reckmeyer retained the law
firm of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered to represent him in connection
with a grand jury investigation in the Eastern District of Virginia. 47
Eighteen months later, on January 15, 1985, Reckmeyer and twentyfive other individuals were indicted 8 for running a massive drug
importation and distribution scheme. 49 The indictment involved fortyeight counts of tax and drug crimes, which included a count of
46. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655
(1989).
47. Brief for the Petitioner at LEXIS screen 13, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) (No. 87-1729) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs
file) (hereinafter Petitioner's Brief). On LEXIS screen 13 of the brief under the
statement of facts, the petitioner stated "at the time, Caplin & Drysdale undertook
the representation, it believed the investigation to involve possible violations of the
criminal tax laws." See also Berg, RICO Risks, 75 A.B.A. J. 28 (1989) (attorney
representing Caplin explained that the firm accepted the case as a criminal tax matter
without knowledge of its RICO implications); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F.
Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986) (stating that Caplin & Drysdale had to retain an
attorney to assist in Reckmeyer's defense because Caplin & Drysdale was not
experienced in defense of drug cases), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing
as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
48. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at LEXIS screen 14.
49. In a plea agreement, Reckmeyer admitted that his organization was responsible for distribution in excess of 169 tons of marijuana and ten tons of hashish over
the course of fifty ventures. United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1217 (4th
Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (1987), rev'd on
reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F 2d
637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2646 (1989).
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(CCE) in violation of

Section 483, Title 21 of the CCE statute. '
On January 14, 1985, a day prior to the indictment, the government used Section 853, subsections (a) and (e), Title 21 of the CCE
statute52 which authorizes forfeiture" of assets tainted by a drug-law
54
violation to obtain an ex parte restraining order from the district
court. The restraining order prevented the transfer or disposal of
assets owned by Reckmeyer which were to be listed in the indictment."
The restraining order would have an immediate effect on Reckmeyer's
ability to pay Caplin & Drysdale for its legal services.
Prior to Reckmeyer's indictment, Caplin & Drysdale had received

6
regular payments for legal services from Reckmeyer.5 However, fol-

lowing the restraining order, checks and cash paying for legal services
already rendered were frozen by the government. On January 14,
1985, the date the restraining order was entered, Caplin & Drysdale
received two checks from Reckmeyer in the amount of $5,000 as
57
partial payments towards outstanding bills; these checks were subsequently returned unpaid. On January 25, 1985, eleven days after
the restraining order was entered, Reckmeyer paid Caplin & Drysdale
5s
$25,000 in cash toward his outstanding legal bills. The district court,

upon notification of the receipt of these funds, ordered deposit of the
50. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at LEXIS screen 13.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
52. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F. 2d 637, 640 (4th
Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2646 (1989).
53. Supra note 23.
54. Supra note 35.
55. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at LEXIS screen 13-14. In the statement
of facts, the petitioner described the government forfeiture demands as involving a
long list of assets. The list contained generic descriptions of assets such as "any and
all possessions" with a value over $1,000 and "any monies deposited by or on behalf
of" Reckmeyer in any bank. Id.
56. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F. 2d 637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
57. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 47, at LEXIS screen 14. The amount owed
& Drysdale as of December 31, 1984 was $26,445 for services rendered and
Caplin
to
costs incurred through that date. Id.
58. Reckmeyer surrendered to authorities on January 25, 1989 after paying
Caplin & Drysdale this amount. See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale,
837 F.2d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
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funds in a separate escrow account pending further order. 9 Following
the indictment, Caplin & Drysdale continued to represent Reckmeyer
at his request .6
On March 7, 1985, Reckmeyer moved to modify the district
court's earlier restraining order to allow him to use some of the
restrained funds to pay Caplin & Drysdale's legal fees. 6' In addition,
he sought to exempt from any postconviction forfeiture order the
assets that he intended to use in payment of attorney fees for Caplin
& Drysdale. 62 However, before the district court could conduct a
hearing on Reckmeyer's motion, he entered into a plea agreement
with the government.63 Under the terms of the agreement, Reckmeyer
pleaded guilty to the CCE charge" and agreed to forfeit all assets
listed in the indictment.61 A day later, the district court denied the
motion to modify the restraining order concluding it was a moot
point because of Reckmeyer's plea agreement. 66 Subsequently, an
order was entered forfeiting all the assets in Reckmeyer's possession. 67
The forfeited assets included $200,000 in U.S. currency, real estate,
gems, and the $25,000 held in the escrow account. 6
After this order was entered, Caplin & Drysdale filed a petition
under Section 853, subsection (n), Title 21 of the CCE statute69 which
permits third parties with an interest in forfeited property to ask the
sentencing court for an adjudication of their rights to that property. 70
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650
(1989).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Reckmeyer also pleaded guilty to two violations of federal tax laws. See
United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on reh'g en banc
sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F. 2d 637 (1988),
aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989).
65. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650
(1989).
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. See United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey 814 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on reh'g
en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637
(1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989).
69. Supra note 36.
70. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650
(1989).
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In their petition, Caplin and Drysdale asserted that they rendered
legal services to Reckmeyer as a good faith provider of services for
in expenses
value. 71 Caplin & Drysdale sought to recover $170,512.99
72
Reckmeyer.
defending
in
incurred
and time charges
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Virginia granted Caplin & Drysdale's claim for $170,512.99 to be

taken from the forfeited assets of Reckmeyer before title would vest

in the government. 73 In reaching this decision, the district court held
that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 does not encompass
74
forfeiture of bona fide attorney fees of criminal defendants. The
district court stated that applying the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
in a manner that allowed forfeiture of bona fide attorney fees would
75
violate the fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution. 76 The district court agreed with the reasoning used by three
other district courts77 that Congress did not intend that the "Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 would encompass bona fide legal fees
71. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F. 2d
637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2646 (1989).
72. Id. The expenses and time charges were categorized as:
a. retention of an attorney experienced in defense of drug cases - $46,975.54
$14,313.95
b. other disbursements (duplicating, investigators, etc.)
$109,223.50
c. Caplin & Drysdale attorney time charges

Id.

73. Id. at 1198.
74. Id.
75. The fifth amendment argument is not discussed at depth in this casenote.
The Court viewed the fifth amendment argument as superfluous once the sixth
amendment argument had fallen. The fifth amendment argument is that the due
process clause is violated when "the balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser" is upset by an obstructive governmental action. See Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470 (1973) (struck down inequitable statute giving the state the right to
discovery of alibi evidence, while a criminal defendant did not have reciprocal
discovery).
76. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-97 (E.D. Va. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on reh'g
en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637
(1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct.
2646 (1989).
77. The three courts that espoused a similar view were: United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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paid to a criminal defendant's attorney." 8 The district court found
that a statutory interpretation of the Act allowing payment of attorney
fees was consistent with Congress' intent, even though an exemption
of attorney fees was not explicitly mentioned in the legislative history.7 9
The district court stated that a contrary interpretation of Congres-

sional intent would violate the fifth and sixth amendments of the
Constitution. 0 The government appealed this decision under a consolidated appeal in United States v. Harvey."'

In Harvey, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court.8 2 However, the panel

affirmed the result on constitutional grounds and rejected the district

court's statutory interpretation grounds.8 3 In rejecting the statutory

grounds used by the district court, the panel held that "the critical
provisions must be interpreted according to their literal import and
that this contemplates the forfeiture of attorney fees in any circumstances where the attorney cannot establish that he was 'without

reasonable cause to believe that the property [used to pay the fee]
was subject to forfeiture.' "84
The panel's constitutional ground for affirming the district court's

decision was that applying the Act under certain circumstances would
78. United. States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Va. 1986),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d
637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2646 (1989).
79. See id. at 1195-96. The court gave considerable weight to a comment in the
legislative history which stated:
Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The Committee therefore does not resolve the
conflict in District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that
impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal trial.
H.R. Rep. No. 845, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 n.l (1984).
80. Id. at 1197.
81. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on reh'g en banc
sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (1988),
aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989). Three cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal because all of the cases
presented important issues regarding forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984. The three cases were: United States v. Bassett & Meredith, United States
v. Caplin & Drysdale, and United States v. Harvey:
82. Id. at 931.
83. See id. at 929.
84. See id. at 918.
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5
violate the sixth amendment right to counsel.8 The panel held that
when "the Act authorizes freeze [restraining of assets] orders and
property forfeitures whose effect is to deprive an accused of the ability
to employ and pay legitimate attorney fees to private counsel to
defend against the charges underlying the forfeiture, such8' applications
6
violate the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice."
The panel found that the burden was on the government to show
that the attorney fees encompassed by a freeze order did not affect a
87
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. The panel
stated that the government needed to prove that one of two factual
issues existed before assets to be used for attorney fees could be
frozen:
[F]irst is whether the defendant has sufficient resources not
sought to be frozen with which to employ private counsel. If
she does, there is no constitutional impediment to issuing the
freeze order as requested.
[Second] [i]f the defendant does not have sufficient untainted
resources, there is only the question whether 'tainted' property
proposed to be transferred as attorney fees is to any extent
based upon sham or fraudulent transaction as opposed to
being within the range of reasonable, hence legitimate, attorney fees. Only to the extent the proposed transfer is found
fraudulent - not legitimate - is any freeze order affecting such
property constitutionally permissible.''8
The panel found that these two situations were the only time that a
freeze order on assets to be used for attorney fees would be constitutional. 9
The government was granted a petition for a rehearing en banc
before the full court of appeals. 90 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in a rehearing en banc reversed the panel's

85. See id. at 926.
86. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d. 905, 926 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
87. See id. at 927-28.
88. Id. at 927.
89. See id. at 927.
90. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d. 637 (4th Cir.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989).
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result. 91 The Fourth Circuit en banc agreed with the original panel's
view that statutory interpretation allows for forfeiture of legitimate
attorney fees. 92 However, unlike the panel, the Fourth Circuit en banc
found nothing in the sixth amendment that would grant a constitutional right to use forfeitable assets for legitimate attorney fees. 93
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered was granted an appeal on writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the en banc rehearing
by the Fourth Circuit. 94 The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision,
held that the CCE statute, which provides no exemption for property
used to pay attorney fees, does not violate a criminal defendant's
fifth or sixth amendment rights. 95
C.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court resolved that applying Section 853, Title 21
of the CCE to encompass bona fide attorney fees was constitutional.
The Court addressed statutory and constitutional arguments against
the application of Section 853 in reaching its decision. Three major
arguments were examined by the Court:
1. Statutory construction of Section 853 permits the district court
to exempt bona fide attorney fees from forfeiture.96
2. Contrary application of the statute violates the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. 97
3. Contrary application of the statute violates the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 9
The first major argument examined by the Court was that the
statute could be construed to permit a district court to exempt bona
fide attorney fees from forfeiture. The Court in Caplin & Drysdale
91. See id. at 649.
92. See id. at 641.

93. See id. at 646, 649. Contra id. at 652 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge
Phillips asserted that this position adopted by the majority "simply begs the constitutional question rather than answering it." Judge Phillips takes issue with allowing
the government to use a legal fiction to obtain such wide control of a person's assets
in contravention of a fundamental right of the accused in a criminal trial.
94. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2657
(1989).
95. See id. at 2655-57.
96. See id. at 2650-51.
97. See id. at 2651-56.
98. See id. at 2656-57. The fifth amendment argument was not given significant
discussion by the Court either in the majority or dissenting opinions. Hence, this
casenote does not go into the reasoning behind it.
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rejected these statutory arguments. 99 The Court deferred to the reasoning in its decision in United States v. Monsanto,100 which was
decided on the same date as Caplin & Drysdale. In Monsanto , the
Supreme Court held that the statutory construction of Section 853,
Title 21 of the CCE statute did not explicitly or implicitly permit the
01
district court to exempt bona fide attorney fees from forfeiture.
The second major argument examined by the Court was that
applying Section 853 to bona fide attorney fees would violate the
sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. 10 2 The petitioner argued
that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice is
violated when he or she is unable to retain counsel due to fear of fee
forfeiture or because of a lack of nonforfeitable assets to retain an
attorney. 103 The Court denied that the statute was an impermissible
violation of the sixth amendment. The Court responded to this
argument by: first, defining the limited scope of the sixth amendment's
protection' °4 and second, by rejecting the petitioner's arguments that
a defendant's interest in using assets to retain his choice of counsel
outweighs the government's interests in holding the assets until completion of the case. 0 5
The Court described a defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice as narrow in scope. The Court stated that whatever
the full extent of the sixth amendment's protection of counsel of
choice, that choice is limited by a defendant's right to spend his own
money to obtain that choice.'0 6 The Court concluded that on its face
the CCE forfeiture statute does nothing to prevent "a defendant from
99. The statutory argument had been successful at the district court level in
Caplin & Drysdale. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. However, the same
argument failed at both the panel and en banc rehearing at the appellate level. See
supra notes 83 & 92 and accompanying text.
100. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). This casenote is focused solely on the constitutional
arguments about restraining assets used to employ counsel of choice. The decision in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered presented the constitutional arguments, while the
Monsanto decision addressed the statutory arguments. In Monsanto, the defendant
was similar to the defendant in Caplin & Drysdale except the assets were restrained
using the RICO forfeiture statute. The Court treated the RICO and CCE forfeiture
statutes as equivalent. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct.
2646, 2651 (1989).
101. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2665 (1989).
102. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2651-56
(1989).
103. Id. at 2652.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 2654-56.
106. See id. at 2652-53.
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hiring the attorney of his choice, or disqualifies any attorney from
serving as a defendant's counsel."' 07 The Court acknowledged that
the CCE statute may disable a defendant's ability to retain counsel
due to fear of fee forfeiture or the lack of nonforfeitable assets with
which to retain an attorney. 0 However, the Court inferred that the
restrained assets should not properly be categorized as a defendant's
money. 0 9 That being the case, the defendant's sixth amendment right
was limited by his own inability to afford counsel of choice.
In the Court's eyes, title converts to the government at the time
of the crime's commission. Hence, the defendant "has no Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person's money [forfeitable assets]
for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only
way ... to retain the attorney of his choice."1 0 The Court used an
example to illustrate its viewpoint: allowing a defendant to use
forfeitable assets was like permitting a bank robber to use the stolen
money for retaining an attorney."' The petitioner conceded that under
the Court's example there is no right to use the bank's assets to retain
an attorney." 12 However, the petitioner distinguished the bank's assets
from forfeitable assets based on the nature of the property right
possessed by the bank and the government."I3 The petitioner contrasted
the bank's traditional property right with the government's property
rights created under the CCE statute via the legal fiction of the
relation-back doctrine. ' 4 The petitioner contended that a significant
difference existed because the government's claim to the assets rested
on a penal statute designed to prevent fraudulent transfers, not
determine true title to property." 5 The Court rejected the petitioner's

Id.

107. Id. at 2652. The Court's reasons supporting this result were:
The forfeiture statute does not prevent a defendant who has nonforfeitable
assets from retaining any attorney of his choosing. Nor is it necessarily the
case that a defendant who possesses nothing but assets the Government
seeks to have forfeited will be prevented from retaining counsel of choice.
Defendants like Reckmeyer may be able to find lawyers willing to represent
them, hoping that their fees will be paid in the event of acquittal, or via
some other means that a defendant might come by in the future.
108. Id.

109.
110.
(1989).
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 2652-53.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652
See id. at 2652-53.
See id. at 2653.
See id.

114. See id.

115. See id.
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view and stated the language of the relation-back provision encompassed "[a]ll right, title, and interest in property" and "vests in the
[government] upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture."" 6 The Court supported its view by asserting that property
rights in Internal Revenue Code forfeitures are determined using a
similar concept.

17

Next, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that a criminal
defendant's right to counsel of choice exceeded the government's
modest interest in restraining all the assets." 8 The petitioner's view
differed from the Court in two areas: first, the petitioner accorded a
greater weight to sixth amendment rights;"19 and second, the petitioner
found the government's interests as modest. 20
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that more weight
should be accorded to expenditures used in exercising sixth amendment
rights.' 2' The Court did not accept the petitioner's view that distinguished the expenditure of forfeitable assets in exercise of one's sixth
amendment rights and expenditures in pursuit of other constitutionally
protected freedoms. 2 The Court stated that the full exercise of the
right to travel, right to practice one's religion, and the right to speak
depend on the ability to use one's financial resources. 23 Forfeiture or
the threat of forfeiture may prevent a defendant from fully enjoying
these constitutional rights. '4 The Court was unwilling 2to create an
exemption related to exercising all constitutional rights.
In fact, the Court asserted that the government's interests in
restraining the assets were more substantial than a criminal defendant's interest in using the assets to choose counsel. 26 The Court
disagreed with the petitioner's assignment of weight in the balancing
the interests of a criminal defendant with the government. Several
important differences were discussed: the legitimacy of the relationback doctrine for preempting a constitutional right; 27 the main pur116. See id.

117. Id.
118. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2654-56

(1989).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id at 2653-54.
See id. at 2654.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

125. See id.

126. See id. at 2652-56.
127. See id. at 2653.
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pose of the legislature in enacting the forfeiture statutes; 28 and the
strength of the government's interests.129
The Court asserted that the relation-back provisions were a
legitimate method of title supported by past decisions. 310 The Court
supported this view by showing that Congress observed that the
"relation back" provision of the CCE statute was similar to forfeiture
provisions used by the Internal Revenue Service.' The Court found
that this was an acceptable means to convey title to the United States
regardless of the fact that title was perfected only upon conviction.3 2
The Court found that the intent of the relation back doctrine was to
give the government title to all assets upon conviction. 3
The petitioner argued that the government's principle interest in
forfeitable assets is to divest a drug dealer or racketeer of the proceeds
of the crime. 3 4 Therefore, under the petitioner's view it follows that
even when assets are paid over to an attorney, the principal end of
forfeiture has been accomplished.'
The petitioner argued that a
defendant's expenditure of assets in exercise of the right to counsel
of choice was consistent with the goal of the statute. 3 6 The Court
gave three reasons for rejecting the petitioner's view. 3 7
First, the government's pecuniary interest in recovered assets goes
beyond divesting drug dealers or racketeers of wealth.1'a These funds
represent a substantial source of income for law enforcement agencies.3 9 Hence, funds siphoned off to criminal defense attorneys would
frustrate the government's maximization of revenue. Second, the
statute already allows for rightful owners to claim assets before they
are retained by the government by using Section 853, subsection (n)
128. See id. at 2654-55.

129. See id.

130. See id. at 2653.
131. The Court cited United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890) to document
the historical acceptance of a similar forfeiture provision. The forfeiture provision
used in Stowell was for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. See Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989).
132. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653

(1989).
133.
134.
(1989).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
was sold

See United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2662-64 (1989).
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2654
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2654-55.
Id. at 2654.
Id. at 2654 n.6. In the instant case, a parcel of land owned by the defendant
by the government for $5.3 million dollars.
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(6) (A).' 40 Therefore, the government is holding the assets for the
rightful owners, who have a right to the return of property in full.' 4 '
The Court viewed restraint of the assets as protecting the rights of
third parties, including attorneys assuming they can meet the statute's
requirements. Third, a major purpose of the forfeiture statutes is to
lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug dealers. The
Court stated a legitimate purpose of the statutes was stripping criminals of the power "to command highpriced legal talent." 42 The Court
concluded that accepting the petitioner's result43would prove problematic whenever the government takes property.
The Court stated there would be an interference with a defendant's sixth amendment rights "whenever the Government freezes or
takes some property in a defendant's possession" if the Court upheld
the petitioner's view.' 44 The Court compared the forfeitures under the
CCE statute to IRS jeopardy assessments which may impair a defendant's rights in the same manner.' 45 Such assessments have been
upheld constitutionally.'" The Court reasoned that if the sixth amendment afforded protection to criminal defendants then several law
jeopardy assessments
enforcement mechanisms operating like IRS
47
would have to be invalidated by the Court.
IV.

ANALYSIS

[I]t is unseemly and unjust for the Government to beggar
those it prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial.
-Justice Harry A. Blackmun48
v. United States
Chartered,
Drysdale
&
Caplin
dissenting in
140. Id. at 2654.
141. See id.

142. See id. at 2654-55.
143. See id. at 2655.
144. Id. at 2655 (quoting from language of the Court of Appeals in In re

Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (1988)).

145. Caplin & Drysdale, Charterei v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655
(1989). Jeopardy assessments are civil forfeitures where the money is already owed
by the defendant and wrongfully withheld. Thus the government has a stronger
interest in the money. See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 926 (4th Cir. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on reh'g en banc sub nor. In re Forfeiture Hearing as
to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F. 2d 637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
146. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655 n.8
(1989). The majority opinion listed several cases in which jeopardy assessments have
been held constitutional.
147. See id. at 2655 n.9.
148.

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Four justices of the Supreme Court in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, challenged the wisdom of the majority's result. 49 In addition,
several courts and commentators had espoused similar opinions that
application of the forfeiture statutes to encompass bona fide attorney
fees was unconstitutional. 5 0 The arguments used by these courts, as
well as the dissent in the instant case, will be used to attack the
majority's reasoning.
Arguments undermining the majority's reasoning in Caplin &
Drysdale, Charteredwill be presented in four major areas. Those four
areas are: first, Congress' purpose in enacting the forfeiture statutes;,
second, the appropriateness of using the relation-back doctrine to
override the sixth amendment;5 2 third, the majority's assertion that a
governmental objective aimed at limiting a defendant's ability to
choose private counsel is a legitimate goal;' and fourth, the systemic
role of the sixth amendment in the criminal justice system.5 4
The first area examined is the conflict between the majority and
dissenters' interpretations of the legislative purpose for enacting the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. The majority described a
major purpose of forfeiture was maximizing the amount of money
the government collects under the statute.' The dissenters on the
other hand found that the legislative history of the Act supported the
petitioner's view that the principle goal of the Act was to strip the
offenders of the profits and prevent funding of future activities. 5 6 If
this interpretation had been accepted by the Court, then the petition149. The four justices were: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id.
150. See e.g. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d. 1316 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, (D. Utah, 1987), rev'd,

841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO

and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How
to Avoid It, 43 U. Mj~em L. REV. 765 (1989); Comment, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Rights v. The Comprehensive ForfeitureAct of 1984, 14 S.U.L. REV. 247 (1987).
151. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667-72 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 2676-77. See also, In re Forfeiture as to Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 652 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (similar reasoning was used by
the dissenters in the lower court), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989).
153. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 2676
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 2672-76.
155. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2654
(1989).
156. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 2670 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

1990:155]

CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED V. UNITED STATES

177

er's contention of allowing the use of assets for attorney fees would
have been consistent since the money would not go to future activity
and would remove profits from a defendant. The dissenters found
support for their position in the Senate Report, House Report and in
a government's concession that the Act was not enacted as a revenueraising measure. 5 7 The dissenters concluded that exempting defense
attorney fees would not be contrary to the legislative intent of the

Act. 158

In the second major area, the flaws in using the relation-back
doctrine to override the sixth amendment's protections are examined
from the dissent's viewpoint. The dissenters stated:
[T]he ultimate constitutional issue might well be framed precisely as whether Congress may use this wholly fictive device
of property law to cut off this fundamental right of the accused
59
in a criminal case.'
The majority's opinion never expressly addressed this question
of paramount importance. The majority opinion made an assumption
that the restrained assets are the property of the government when it
stated "a defendant has no sixth amendment right to spend another
person's money for services rendered by an attorney."'16 But that
assumption begs the question because the government's reason for
restraining the assets is to determine if they can be converted to the
government's property. The dissent expressed concern that the majority jumped to the "conclusion that the Government is free to deem a
defendant indigent by declaring his assets 'tainted' by criminal activity
the Government has yet to prove.' ' 6' The dissenters concluded that
"the majority implicitly finds the sixth amendment right to counsel
of choice so insubstantial that it can be outweighed by a legal
fiction. "1 62

157. Id. at 2670. "The majority ignores the Government's concession at oral
arguments before the en banc Second Circuit Court of Appeals that the Act was not
enacted as a revenue-raising measure." Id. at 2670 n.6.
158. See id. at 2671-72.
159. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2676 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting In re Forfeiture as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637, 652 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips, J., dissenting)).
160. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652
(1989).
161. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2672
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2672.
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The dissenters examined the strength of the property interest
created under relation-back and inferred that the relation-back property interest, standing alone, could not preempt a constitutional
right. 63 This inference is found in the dissenters' statement:
If the right must yield here to countervailing governmental
interests, the relation-back device undoubtedly could be used
to implement the governmental interests, but it cannot serve
as a substitutefor them (emphasis added).'64
The dissenters contrasted the substantiality of the government interest
in the assets created under relation-back with the defendant's interests
in choosing counsel. The dissenters described the government interest
as:
[An] interest in the assets at the time of their restraint is no
more than an interest in safeguarding fictive property rights,
one which hardly weighs at all against the defendant's formidable Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel for his de65
fense.
The dissenters found that the government has "no property interest
in the defendant's assets before the defendant is convicted."' 66 The
dissenters reasoned that "prior to conviction, sole title to such assets... rests in the defendant; no other party has any present legal
claim to them." 67
Why should the sole title to the frozen assets rest in the defendant
prior to conviction? Part of the answer to that question can be found
in the fundamental structure of our criminal system. A criminal
defendant is cloaked in innocence during a trial. In addition, the
burden is on the government to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime and until
that occurs a defendant should retain his existing property right. A
contrary result would imply that the burden is being improperly shifted
to the criminal defendant. The other part of the answer to that
question is that the dissenters embraced the petitioner's view that
163. See id. at 2676.

164. Id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered,

837 F.2d 637, 652 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips, J., dissenting)).

165. Id. at 2677.
166. Id. at 2676.
167. Id.
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relation-back property rights are weaker than traditional rights. 68 The
dissent stated that in the majority's bank robber example that the
assets are merely in possession of a defendant whereas in the case of
forfeitable assets, sole title as well as possession rests with the defendant. 169 Judge Logan of the United States Court of Appeals elucidated
this distinction between these property rights:
The government's interest in the property allegedly subject to
criminal forfeiture is of a different nature than the interest of
a bank seeking to recover stolen currency . .

.

.The latter are

based upon traditional common law property ownership concepts embraced in the Constitution. . . .the government's interest in forfeited property, on the other hand, does not derive
from a common law ownership right to the property, for the
government neither owned the property before the crime nor
gave value for the property as a creditor or purchaser does. 70
In addition, the dissenters stated that in most instances, the
forfeitable assets sought by the government are not within the two
categories of items, contraband or evidentiary value, where tight fisted
control has been deemed necessary.' 7' The forfeitable assets, unlike
the bank or ransom money, are "derivative proceeds of crime,
property that was not itself acquired illegally, but was purchased with
72
the profits of a crime.'
While the government's interests are not weighty enough to
dictate rigid control, the defendant's sixth amendment right depends
on timely use to be effective. The crucial time in a defendant's right
to choose counsel arises prior to conviction. 73 Therefore, the urgency
of exercising this constitutional right suggests that the prudent course
is to err on the side of the individual. Otherwise, without a guarantee
that attorney fees will not be frozen, a defendant may have difficulty
finding private counsel even when no restraining order has been
168. See id. at 2676.
169. See id.

170. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1510 (10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J.,

dissenting).

171. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2676

n.15 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The two classes of items are: contraband,

which the government is free to seize because the law recognizes no right to possess
it and assets possessing evidentiary value, which may be seized and retained by the
government even if the person is found not guilty. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 267677 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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entered. Hence, the threat of forfeiture, alone, can chill a defendant's
ability to choose counsel even when the assets are not yet frozen by
the government. The dissenters concluded that allowing a defendant
the use of frozen assets is necessary to insure his or her sixth
amendment right would not be diluted because of the potential
74
forfeiture. 1
The majority's attempt to legitimize use of the relation-back
doctrine by comparing it to IRS jeopardy assessments was not persuasive. The dissenters noted two critical distinctions.'" One distinction is that:
[T]he IRS in that situation has a legal claim to the sums at
issue at the time of the assessment based upon substantive
provisions of the Code. Here, in contrast, the government's
76
claim will not arise until after conviction.'
A second distinction is that a jeopardy assessment would be challenged
in the Tax Court. The sixth amendment does not apply to civil courts
such as the Tax Court.'" Hence, an individual could be deprived of
the right to counsel of choice under this setting without violating the
Constitution.
The third major area of analysis is the majority's assertion that
a governmental objective aimed at limiting a defendant's ability to
chose private counsel was a legitimate purpose. The majority acknowledged that limiting a defendant's ability to retain high priced legal
counsel was "somewhat unsettling.' ' 7 8 The majority admitted that
the "harsh reality" is that the quality of a criminal defense may
depend on the ability to choose counsel. '7 However, the majority
reasoned that the government's goal was legitimate when it concluded
that a defendant has no "right to use the proceeds of crime to finance
an expensive defense."' 8 0 Again, the majority presumes that the
restrained assets are the proceeds of a crime while, in reality, that
conclusion is not warranted until a defendant is found guilty.' 8' The
174. See id. at 2676-77.
175. See id. at 2676 n.15.
176. Id. at 2676 n.15.
177. Id.

178. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655
(1989).
179. See id. at 2655.
180. See id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th Cir. 1988)).
181. Caplin &Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2676 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority uses a presumptuous conclusion to justify its staunch refusal
to allow funds to be used for counsel.
The majority alluded to the despicability and power of organized
crime especially drug dealers, whom these forfeiture statutes will
affect, as supporting their decision.'8 2 While the dissent did not address
this allusion, an appellate judge in In Re Forfeiture Hearing as to
Caplin & Drysdale took aim at the inappropriateness of considering
these factors:
I am prepared to accept that the depredations of organized
crime, particularly those involving drug dealing in contemporary society, rank just behind human slavery among the sorest
domestic afflictions of our history. But I do not believe that
the enormity of particular crimes and types of criminal activity
and the despicability and power of particular types of criminals
can properly be weighed in this particular constitutional bal-

ance.8 3

The dissent challenged the majority's view as being not only

unsettling but "constitutionally suspect, and .

.

. completely foreign

to Congress' stated Goals."'" The Court has recognized that there is
a "presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice" which
must be overcome by a legitimate governmental interest. 85 The dissent
asserted that weakening a defendant's ability to defend himself is an
advantage but that it cannot be considered legitimate.'1 The dissents
argument against legitimacy draws greater support if the sixth amendment is viewed as serving two roles, an institutional role, as well as,

182. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2655 (1989)
(quoting In re Forfeiture as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th
Cir. 1988)). "The modern day Jean Valjean must be satisfied with appointed counsel.

Yet the drug merchant claims that his possession of huge sums of money ... entitles
him to something more."
183. In re Forfeiture
(Phillips, J., dissenting),
States, 109 S. Ct. 2646

Id.
Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 652 (1988)
aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
(1989). Judge Phillips' comments apply to the Supreme

Court's opinion in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered because the majority borrowed
heavily from the en banc panel's reasoning and language, which was criticized by
Judge Phillips. Id.
184. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2670 n.7
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988).
186. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 2676 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the role of protecting an individual defendant's right. The institutional
role of the sixth amendment is concerned with governmental action
that prevents defense attorneys, individually and as a class, from
performing their role in the adversary system.'18 The dissent claimed
that weakening a defendant's ability to defend himself would injure
the institutional role protected by the sixth amendment. 88
The dissent relied on the institutional role of the sixth amendment
in justifying its result.8 9 The majority's failure to consider how its
decision's effects on the adversary system is one of the most fundamental differences between the dissenters and the majority. In fact,
the dissenters proclaimed that "[t]he majority's decision in this case
reveals that it has lost track of the distinct role of the right to counsel
of choice in protecting the integrity of the judicial process. . . ."9o
The sixth amendment's institutional function requires that an attorney
remain "free from any conflict of interest or governmental influence
which might interfere with the loyal rendering of that service in the
adverse struggle of litigants."' 9 The practical effects of attorney fee
forfeiture may effectively remove private counsel from representing
defendants subject to forfeiture.
A.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

The Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered decision will affect private
criminal defense attorneys, public defenders, RICO and CCE defendants, and prosecutors in the war against organized crime, especially
with the government's cause celebre against drug dealers. Several
notable effects may occur: the withdrawal of private attorneys from
these cases; 92 ethical dilemmas for private attorneys who choose to
represent these clients for payment;1'1 a concomitant increased caseload for public defenders; 94 a potent weapon against organized crime
187. See generally Cloud, Forfeiting Attorney Fees: Applying An Institutional
Role Theory To Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1 (1987).
188. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 267576 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. See id.
190. Id. at 2672.
191. Cloud, Forfeiting Attorney Fees: Applying An Institutional Role Theory
To Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1, 12 (1987).
192. Supra note 39.
193. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667,
2675 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Winick, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees Under
RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The ConstitutionalDilemma
and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MLArm L. REv. 765, 775-77 (1989).
194. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 267475 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and drug dealers in the government's hands;' 95 and possible expansion
of forfeiture statutes to other crimes and the states.'9
In addition to the dissenters in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered,
many commentators feel that the practical impact of the Supreme
Court's decision is that the private criminal bar in most cases will no
longer represent RICO and CCE defendants.'9 The majority opinion
asserted that forfeiture statutes were constitutional because some
attorneys may represent defendants on the likelihood of an acquittal
98
or an untold future windfall which will enable the client to pay.
However, while the majority considered the possibility of retaining
counsel, the practical effect of this decision was not addressed by the
Court. That practical effect is that a private lawyer may not be willing
to risk undertaking an expensive trial on the possibility of payment.
Private counsel may become virtually nonexistent for the majority of
defendants because of the prohibitive expenses involved in these
criminal defenses. 99
Lawyers who accept a RICO or CCE client possessing only
forfeitable assets confront ethical dilemmas that cast a cold chill over
attorney client relations. The dissenters in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered used these ethical dilemmas in illustrating the statute's impermissible influence upon the sixth amendment's institutional role. 200
The problem originates from a private attorney's conflict in representing his client's best interests while assuring he receives payment
for his services. For example, an attorney's interest in payment for
services may conflict with his client's interests during plea negotiations. 20' In plea negotiations, whether the government waives forfeiture of attorney fees may influence a private defense attorney's ability
to negotiate in the client's best interest. 202 The situation wherein an
attorney's payment depends on acquittal of a client may not always
195. See id. at 2675.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 2675-76. See e.g., Fricker, Dirty Money, 75 A.B.A. J. 60, 64
(Nov. 1989); Berg, RICO Risks, 75 A.B.A. J. 28 (Oct. 1989).
198. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652

(1989).
199. "[Tlhe average cost of pretrial preparation and litigation for a multicount,
RICO-related case is about $100,000 ....
For a trial lasting two months ... the
[cost] would be at least $250,000.... ." Berg, RICO Risks, 75 A.B.A. J. 28, 29

(Oct. 1989).

200. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2674-76
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
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be in the best interests of a client, especially when a favorable plea
agreement is offered in a weak defense case. Another problem is that
if payment will occur only if a defendant is acquitted, then taking the
case could be viewed as accepting a criminal case on a contingency
basis, which violates ethical rules.203 One solution to these dilemmas
is for an attorney to accept these clients pro bono. Outside of that
extreme solution, each attorney must wrestle with these problems and
decide if it is feasible to accept these clients.
The attorney's other alternative to qualify for payment requires
he or she convince the judge that he or she falls within section 853
(n), Title 21 of the United States Code.2 However, this alternative
requires that the attorney remain ignorant of the restrained assets'
origin. 2 5 This ignorance could affect an attorney's ability to adequately represent a client. 2° Therefore, while attorneys are not technically excluded from using section 853 (n) to receive payment, the
attorneys' ignorance could be unethical and contrary to a client's
207
interest.
The desertion of the private bar from these cases places a
correlative added load on an already overburdened public defender's
office. 208 The public defender's office will face a new challenge in
regard to these added cases. 2°" That challenge is maintaining competent
counsel necessary to deal with an onslaught of complex cases. 210 The
public defender's office may engage specialists. The money to support
that decision must come from some source within the government.
The potential onslaught of cases, previously handled by private counsel, may increase the number of appeals claiming incompetent representation. 21 ' The cost of representing RICO defendants multiplied by
an increase in forfeiture induced indigency make these possibilities
that the government may have to address.2 12 The public defender's
203. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2656 n.10
(1989).

204. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2675
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
205. Id.

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.

209. See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988) (estimated
that RICO or CCE charges could be appended to 250o of the federal criminal cases).
210. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2674-75
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. This comment is not meant to suggest that public defenders are less
competent. It is meant to reflect the reality of high caseloads and complex cases.

212. See supra note 199 and note 209.

1990:155]

CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED V. UNITED STATES

office shoulders the responsibility for defending RICO and CCE
charged individuals if private counsel rejects these clients.
While the effects on private defense counsel and the public
defender's office may be damaging to individuals, the Court's decision
should provide an effective weapon in the government's war against
drug dealers and organized crime. The ability to control the choice of
a defendant's counsel can be a tremendous advantage for the prosecution. In United States v. Rogers, a district court stated that the
exclusion of private defense counsel by appending forfeiture charges
to RICO indictments was the "ultimate tactical advantage. ' 21 3 In
addition, the dissenters in Caplin & Drysdale asserted that other
district courts have echoed a warning that permitting this action posed
a danger to the integrity of the adversary system. 21 4 Even the majority
in Caplin & Drysdale admitted that the quality of a defendant's
defense "may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can
buy. ' 21 5 This being the case, disabling a defendant's choice of counsel
by rigidly controlling the assets of a suspected drug dealer, may affect
the outcome of a case. The logical consequence of removing access
to expensive legal talent may result in more convictions and plea
negotiations favoring the government. 21 6 In addition, the government
receives a financial benefit from the Court's decision not to exempt
attorney fees from the forfeiture statutes. 2 7 The sums expended in
the defense of these charges can be considerable. 28 Those additional
sums will reward the law enforcement agencies waging war against
21 9
drug dealers and organized crime.
The power of forfeiture mechanism could fuel its expansion to
new categories of federal crimes and spread to the states. 220 The extent
to which the forfeiture statutes expand may depend on the type of
213. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985) (held
bona fide attorney fees not subject to forfeiture under RICO statute).

214. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2667

n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting opinion).

215. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655

(1989)(quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
result)).

216. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2675 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2654
(1989).

218. Supra note 199.
219. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2654
(1989).
220. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2675 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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criminal targeted by these statutes. Drug dealers and organized crime
do not elicit much popular support. Others, such as white collar
professionals may invoke more sympathy. 221 Barring the use of these
statutes in a way that enrages the common man, these statutes can be
used expansively and will spread into new areas.
Forfeiture of criminal defense attorney fees, while producing a
laudable result, may not have been intended by Congress. 222 The
dissent and majority disagreed as to Congressional intent. The majority suggested that Congress will overturn the Court's decision of
allowing the statutes to encompass bona fide attorney fees if the
majority was in error. 223 However it is unlikely that Congress will
review this decision. The Supreme Court's decision in Caplin &
Drysdale, Charteredaffected a group of individuals who are the target
of society's scorn and an overturning of this result would be politically
unpopular. For these reasons, it appears Congress would be reluctant
to overturn the Court's result in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered.
The Supreme Court's result in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered is
consistent with its other recent decisions 224 which have minimized the
importance of chosen counsel in civil and criminal situations. The
Supreme Court appears willing to permit the judiciary or legislature
to obstruct a defendant's right to counsel of choice if the Court feels
there is a substantial reason. The Court's failure to support the right
to retain chosen counsel may lead to a virtual socialization of criminal
defense work in this country for particular crimes. 225
The constitutional right to counsel of choice appears hinged on
the accused's choice of criminal activity. When the defendant is a
wealthy drug dealer or an organized crime figure then society's
interests are deemed superior. If the accused is a wealthy serial killer,
however, his right to counsel of choice is unfettered. Society's interest
in obstructing a wealthy murderer's defense is just as strong yet the
221. Chicago defense attorney Stephen Komie feels that forfeiture would be
much less popular in cases like the indictment of Chicago commodities traders and
that was why the government assured the defense bar that forfeiture would not be
sought. See Fricker, Dirty Money, 75 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (Nov. 1989).
222. Supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
223. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2665 (1989).
224. See United States v. Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (district court can
override a criminal defendant's waiver of conflict free counsel and remove chosen
counsel); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321-26 (1985)
($10 fee limitation on attorney fees in an administrative hearing which denied litigants
a realistic opportunity for chosing legal counsel was constitutional).
225. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2673
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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result is different. Regardless of whether the wealthy serial killer or
drug dealer is undeserving of choosing counsel, the fact remains that
when indicted the defendants are only accused not guilty. Allowing
the end to justify the means, diminishes the Constitution's protection
of all citizens' rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartereddecided that the sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice is an insubstantial right. The
chilling effect of the forfeiture statute on choosing counsel manifests
itself in two ways. First, if all of a defendant's assets are frozen by
the forfeiture statutes, then the defendant's inability to pay counsel
will remove his ability to choose counsel. Second, the threat of later
forfeiture affects the ability to choose counsel, even when the assets
are not yet frozen, because attorneys become unwilling to represent
these clients. The forfeiture statutes effectively obstruct a defendant's
right to counsel of choice.
The Supreme Court washed its hands of the assertion that the
forfeiture statutes impermissibly affect the right to counsel of choice
by claiming that on its face the statutes do not prevent choice of
counsel.2 6 The Court stated that attorneys under this statute may
continue to represent clients and that clients may have unrestrained
assets available to use in some cases. 227 The Court reasoned that title
to the frozen assets is not determined until the resolution of trial
therefore a defendant has no right to use the assets.28 But how the
Court reaches this conclusion that the frozen assets are another's
property which the defendant has no right to use for his or her defense
is left unexplained. This leap in logic is exactly what will be determined
at trial-so it appears as if guilt has been determined and only sentence
awaits a CCE defendant.
Why shouldn't a defefidant with no other resource than the
frozen assets be allowed to use these assets for his criminal defense?
It is important to recall that in our system of justice a defendant is
presumed innocent. In addition, the burden of proof is on the
government in a criminal trial. The Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Harvey would have placed the burden on the back of the govern-

226. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
227. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
228. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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ment in these instances .229 The Fourth Circuit in Harvey would have
required the government to prove that the defendant has sufficient
unrestrained assets to employ private counsel or that the proposed
fees transferred to the attorney is a sham to avoid forfeiture. 2 0 This
compromise would have respected the government's interests in the
frozen assets while allowing a defendant to exercise his or her right
to counsel of choice. This is the more logical course of action because
it recognizes the defendant's presumption of innocence while the
asset's title is unclear. The need to exercise a defendant's right to
counsel of choice is dependant on time. To wait until the resolution
of trial will render this a nugatory right. Therefore, the inaction
demanded by the government with regards to the frozen assets destroys
a defendant's right just as effectively as an overt act.
The goal of crippling the drug dealers and the organized crime
community is a noble goal but it loses its luster when the government
cripples a defendant's access to counsel to achieve its end. Confiscating illicit wealth gained from illegal activity is a substantial interest
of the government. The unobstructed right of an individual to choose
his or her counsel when fighting against the might of the government
should be a substantial right under the sixth amendment. The Court's
decision has given a potent weapon to the government but at a great
cost to out adversary system and individual rights.
The Court never explicitly stated that drug dealers and organized
crime's unsavory publicity had a bearing in its result. However, the
Supreme Court alluded to the "Jean Valjeans" of the world as not
being allowed to prosper from their activity.2"3' It is easy to justify
restricting the rights of creatures who deal drugs or engage in organized crime. However, if protections are to be meaningful then they
must extend to even the most unworthy. Until a verdict is reached,
the suspect, no matter what crime he or she is charged with, should
be presumed innocent. This presumption of innocence should encourage erring on the side of individual rights especially in a criminal trial
wherein the might of the government will be brought to bear on a
defendant. The end does 'not justify the means even when the goal is
to rid society of drug dealers.
ANTHONY
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VELLA

229. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 927 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &

Drysdale, 837 F. 2d 637 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
230. Id.
231. Supra note 187 and accompanying text.

